“¡A Toda Vida Venezuela!”– La Gran Misión

Venezuela is launching a new Mission – perhaps the most relevant in recent years. In the world top 10 most violent countries, 8 are Latino Americans, and Venezuela is fifth, but is Venezuela holding the number one spot where the gap between the perception of violence and the real violence is the biggest? This has a media element in the middle of the political polarisation. Nevertheless, the death toll by violent crime is not a small number by civilised standards.



The Grand Mission ¡A Toda Vida Venezuela! was launched yesterday by president Hugo Chavez, to tackle this issue in its core with six strategic areas of action, each of them with several measures. Here what I could take note of:


1) Crime prevention by a secure and peaceful coexistence (or situational prevention).

• 1.1 Guns and munition control.
• 1.2 Reinstate youngsters between 15 & 17 years old into education in areas of greatest criminal risks. There are 700,000 youngsters at risk.
• 1.3 To guarantee first refusal for employment of youngsters at risk.
• 1.4 Fund broadcasting schools for youngsters at risk (4,000 teenagers at initial stage).
• 1.5 Extension of El Sistema music program with 39 new nucleus and the improvement of 40 established groups in critical zones.
• 1.6 Sports education plan, recovering 790 sport spaces, servicing 79,000 teenagers.
• 1.7 Education plan for a Culture of Peace, seeking a responsible consumption of alcohol and eliminate use of drugs, promoting tolerance and respectful coexistence.
• 1.8 Communal centres for conflict solving.
• 1.9 Victim attention centres. (Bs. 289.3 millions)

2) Reinforce of policing bodies (Bs. 2,200 millions budget).

• 2.1 Patrolling by quadrants, penetrating the most troubled zones, not just the main streets. Situational rooms for analysis in real time.
• 2.2 Communal police in reduced areas.
• 2.3 Police equipment donation.
• 2.4 Training in communication.
• 2.6 Unified communication system.

3) Transformation of the Judicial System and the finding of alternative conflict resolution systems.

• 3.1 Municipal Judicial Courts for minor crimes (less than 8 years jail penalty), plus Municipal Public Attorneys.
• 3.2 Transform penitentiary centres to retraining and re-socialising centres.
• 3.3 Reduce violent criminal impunity by separating the criminal causes individually.

4) Modernisation of police bodies.

• 4.1 Separation between function and specialisation of the criminal investigation police (CICPC) no more patrolling or inmate guarding.
• 4.2 Investigation officer, scientific formation in the UNES by role and speciality.
• 4.3 New facilities for the CICPC
• 4.4 New facilities for forensic medicine.
• 4.5 Specialised units for anti-kidnapping, vehicle related robbery .

5) Assistance to victim of violence (Bs. 289.3 millions)

• 5.1 new Justice Houses. I need to find more info on this one.

6) Knowledge creation and socialisation of solidarity coexistence.

• 6.1 Understanding of the reinforcement factor of the culture of violence. Knowledge generation system.
• 6.2 UNES expansion to 7 new centres, plus 6 new under construction.
• 6.3 Retraining of the 90,000 existing police officers in Venezuela.

86% of homicides are concentrated in just 79 of the 345 municipalities in Venezuela. It’s upon them where the Mission will focus its targets in the fist period, before addressing the rest of the country.

In total, the first phase of this mission will invest Bs. 5,900 million ($1,370 million), out of which Bs. 1,682 million will be completed this year (2012).

This Mission comes after a long period of preparation, understanding and correction since 2006. That year was summoned the CONAREPOL, an ad-hoc team of experts assembled to understand the violence phenomenon in Venezuela. Then, in 2008, as a result of the diagnostic report, the new law of Policing Service was passed, which brought necessary standards in a chaotic service split in many pieces across the country due to erronoeus decentralization. In 2009, the law of Policing Function Code, organised the standards of how the police officer must be chosen and progressed scaling up in his/her professional career. That same year, the Experimental University for Security (UNES) was born in parallel with a new Bolivarian National Police (PNB), it was a very welcome new style in education and policing based on human rights respect, proportional use of force and proximity work with the communities. Something never seen before in Venezuela (where the citizens where more scared of the police than the criminals). Just recently in 2012, the three laws that dealt with criminal were comprehensibly redrafted to allow the necessary harmonisation with the constitutional principles. Procedure and red tape that were creating bottle necks in the judicial system to achieve timely justice were scrapped. Those three laws were: the Penal Code (what is a crime); the organic penal procedure code (how to punish it) and the law for penitential services (jail administrative services).

Since the implementation of the UNES and PNB, the results from the pilot program were immediate and illuminating the way forward. The self organisation of the communities around the PNB brought an effective way to supply relevant intelligence of the gangs affecting the communities, and more key data about the extension and variations of the violence phenomenon.

The catastrophic events of the mountains deluges in November and December 2011, when many houses where destroyed around Caracas, the PNB probed being a key player in the communal organisation during the escape from death. The toll for lost life was miraculously minimum, but the devastation was enormous. Around 20,000 families (100,000 people) were homeless in just a few days. For that very emergency the Gran Mision Vivienda Venezuela was launched, but that is another post.

Why this hasn’t been done before? Why does everything seem to start in 2006? I think the answer is simple and very complex at the same time. Because nobody knew how to do it, and learning and building the knowledge took a long time. Not a hard hand policing policy like the reactionary school in previous years, where the principle was “they are criminals ‘kill them, kill them all!” On the other hand, prior to 2006 the stress caused by the political instability blocked all possibilities of solving a problem of this magnitude, which is especially a structural and systemic problem inherited from long years of mismanagement and external pressures, like the Colombian paramilitary “demobilization” that just changed territory in 2002-2004, many of them migrating into Venezuela to carry on criminal business as usual.

I’m celebrating that finally Venezuela has reached the point where all the pieces are in place to tackle this issue. But still I am concerned about the attitude of the opposition that seems to think they can walk away from this problem, or can sort it out differently. This is not an issue to play politics with, it’s the most vital issue for many in Venezuela.

It is frustrating to see the Venezuelan opposition leaders talk like is nothing to do with them, assuming it is their right to criticise the government or boycot it no matter what is at stake. I demand from the Venezuelan opposition loyalty to the country, loyalty to the people.

Let’s support the success of this Mission. The mission is life, full life.